As
the reader is probably aware, the notion of purpose or teleology is
forbidden
in science, among biologists especially, who, while they must be strongly
tempted to invoke it at every turn, avoid it as a reformed alcoholic avoids a
drink. Physicists avoid it because their problems don't require it.
Yet
we find one of the greatest physicists saying that:
.
. . the historical development of theoretic research in physics had led
in
a remarkable way to a formulation of the principle of physical causality which
possesses an explicitly teleological character. (5)
But I do not wish to make an issue of this
question of teleology here.
Let
us simply note one thing: that there is only one exception to the exclusion of
purpose from science, and this exception is light, which these several
scientists have seen fit to regard as having a purposive behavior. Let us also
note that the purposiveness is associated with that aspect of light known as
the principle of action (or least action).
Importance
of Planck's Discovery
That Action Comes in Wholes
What
did Planck add to this principle of action that was not already
present
in the ideas of Leibniz? It was the notion that action comes in
quanta or
wholes, and that this unit is constant. Note that despite the
tendency to refer to energy as quantized
— a habit which
even good physicists are given to
— it is not energy but action that comes in wholes.
Action
= E x T (Energy x Time) = Constant (h)
Action
is constant, energy
is proportional to frequency. (T is the time of one cycle.)
So
far, except for the reference to purpose, I have kept within the bounds of
accepted science. Now I would like to go further to track down this notion of
purpose which Planck, and before him Leibniz, felt was indicated by the
principle of least action.
As
we have noted, purpose is barred from science. As Bacon said: "Purpose
like a virgin consecrated to God is (for science) barren."
But
as Whitehead pointed out in his
Function of Reason: (6)
"Scientists,
animated by the purpose of proving they are purposeless, constitute an
interesting subject for study." As Whitehead went on to say, we must
distinguish "between the authority of science in the determination of its
own methodology and the authority of science in the determination of the
ultimate categories of explanation." Whitehead obviously wants to include
purpose as an ultimate category of explanation.
How
may we include purpose in cosmology (the ultimate categories of explanation)
while still excluding it from the methodology of science?
We
know that science builds its entire edifice on three measures:
mass,
length, and time, and their combination, and all scientific formulation can be
expressed in these terms. Clearly, there is no evidence of purpose in any of
these: it is not in mass, nor in length, nor in time.
The
only suspicion of it, as we noted, occurs in the formula for action. Action
has the measure formula
.
This
combines mass
(M), length (L), and time (T). Is it possible that there is something
present in the whole that is not in the parts?
This
is clearly the case here. Consider any device made of parts, say a bottle and
its cork or a flashlight and its bulb. Is it possible to find the function
of the device in the parts? Surely, no. Only when the device is
put
together can it express its function and its purpose, something its parts
alone could never do.
It
was Planck's epoch-making discovery that action comes in wholes, a
discovery which in retrospect we can see to be true of human actions. We
cannot have 1½ or 1.42 actions. We cannot decide to get up, vote, jump out
the window, call a friend, speak, or do anything one-and-a-half times.
Wholeness
is inherent in the nature of action, of decision, of
purposive activity. Planck's discovery about light touches home: it is true of
our own actions. But we didn't really know this until the physicists had made
this a principle.
Light
as First Cause
